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Abstract
Background: Infectious disease emergencies are increasingly becoming part of the health
care delivery landscape, having implications to not only individuals and the public, but
also on those expected to respond to these emergencies. Health care workers (HCWs)
are perhaps the most important asset in an infectious disease emergency, yet these indi-
viduals have their own barriers and facilitators to them being willing or able to respond.
Aim: The purpose of this review was to identify factors affecting HCW willingness to
respond (WTR) to duty during infectious disease outbreaks and/or bioterrorist events.
Methods:An integrative literature reviewmethodology was utilized to conduct a structured
search of the literature including CINAHL, Medline, Embase, and PubMed databases
using key terms and phrases. PRISMA guidelines were used to report the search outcomes
and all eligible literature was screened with those included in the final review collated and
appraised using a quality assessment tool.
Results: A total of 149 papers were identified from the database search. Forty papers were
relevant following screening, which highlighted facilitators of WTR to include: availability
of personal protective equipment (PPE)/vaccine, level of training, professional ethics, family
and personal safety, and worker support systems. A number of barriers were reported to
prevent WTR for HCWs, such as: concern and perceived risk, interpersonal factors,
job-level factors, and outbreak characteristics.
Conclusions: By comprehensively identifying the facilitators and barriers to HCWs’
WTR during infectious disease outbreaks and/or bioterrorist events, strategies can be
identified and implemented to improve WTR and thus improve HCW and public
safety.
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Introduction
During any emergency situation, health care workers (HCWs) are
an important part of the response workforce. The role of HCWs,
including those working in emergency response roles, is critical
during emergencies such as infectious disease outbreaks or bioter-
rorist events, particularly for ensuring patient and public well-
being. Yet, there are a number of studies that demonstrate a lack
of willingness to respond (WTR) to emergencies by HCWs with
a particular reluctance to respond during an infectious agent event
compared to any other type of emergency, such as a natural disaster,
nuclear, radiological, or chemical emergency event.1-4 Although
there is a growing literature on HCW WTR to infectious disease
emergencies, to date, no review has focused on the barriers or facil-
itators to these specifically.
In order to better prepare for staffing crises due to non-illness-
related absenteeism during infectious disease emergencies, it is impor-
tant to understand who will come to work and why. Previous events
such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), H1N1 influ-
enza, Ebola, Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and
the current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak high-
lighted the rapidity with which outbreaks of infectious disease emerge
and the importance of understanding barriers and facilitators for
WTR to duty amongHCWs. Given the reducedWTR to infectious
disease emergencies, a review of barriers and facilitators specific to
these is vital to understanding and improving response during an out-
break or bioterrorist incident.
The primary objectives of this review are to: (1) describe the rates
of willingness of HCWsworld-wide to respond to an infectious dis-
ease outbreak; and (2) describe the barriers and facilitators for will-
ingness at the individual and organizational levels. This information
may help inform disaster preparedness planning and provide direc-
tion for interventions that have the potential to decrease non-illness
absenteeism across all segments of the health care sector.
Method
An integrative review methodology was used as it includes various
perspectives on a subject or topic and is currently the broadest type
of research review, which has been advocated as important to health
science and research.5 The framework developed by Whittemore
and Knafl5 guided this review and includes: problem identification,
literature search, data evaluation, data analysis, and presentation of
the data. Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and
Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) was also used to guide study identifica-
tion and selection.6
Search Strategies
Anelectronic database search of the peer-reviewed literature published
from October 2000 through April 2020 was conducted to identify all
English-language studies on WTR to infectious disease emergencies
among HCWs. The search was conducted through CINAHL
(EBSCO Information Services; Ipswich, Massachusetts USA);
Medline (US National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of
Health; Bethesda, Maryland USA); Embase (Elsevier; Amsterdam,
Netherlands); and PubMed (National Center for Biotechnology
Information, National Institutes of Health; Bethesda, Maryland
USA) databases for all articles published during this period. All data-
base queries included the phrase “willingness to respond,” both alone
and in combination using the Boolean search term ANDwith one of
the following keywords: “bioterrorism,” “smallpox,” “pandemic,”
“influenza,” “SARS,” “Ebola,” “MERS,” “COVID-19,” “terrorism,”
“disaster,” and “outbreak.” Tables of contents for all issues of the
journals Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, American Journal of Disaster
Medicine, and Prehospital and Disaster Medicine since 2000 were
reviewed by hand for additional relevant articles.
The initial search identified a total of 149 potential articles from
the database search; an additional 34 articles were identified from
the scan of journals by hand. After excluding duplicates, 95 articles
were initially screened based on title and abstracts for those that
met the inclusion criteria, by the first and last author, resulting
in 50 full-text articles being screened. For inclusion in the review,
articles had to include an assessment of willingness of HCWs to
respond to an infectious disease outbreak, but this could have been
either a hypothetical outbreak scenario, including during training,
or an actual disease incident. At the time of assessing the full-text
articles, three were excluded due to not measuring WTR, five for
not having a specific measure of WTR for infectious disease emer-
gencies, and two for poor quality (described below). This resulted
in 40 studies included in the integrative synthesis. A systematic
flow diagram (Figure 1), based on PRISMA, was used to display
the search strategy and provides a breakdown of the search results.6
Data Extraction and Synthesis
Each article was assessed for quality, including study design and
sample size. In addition, the occupation of participants, location,
incident type, pathogen(s), and WTR among HCWs was
extracted from each paper (Table 1). Incidents were classified as
naturally occurring outbreaks or bioterrorist-related incidents
based on the framing of questions used to determine willingness
or the specific pathogen incidents or disease described to study par-
ticipants. All articles discussing hypothetical smallpox outbreaks
were assumed to address bioterrorist-related outbreaks. Factors
that were either facilitators or barriers for WTR were collated
and are presented in Table 2.
Quality Assessment
In order to assess the quality of the articles included in the review,
the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT) version 2018 was
used as it, unlike other appraisal tools, allows for a variety of studies
to be included in its assessment including quantitative, qualitative,
and mixed methods research designs.7 The MMAT has been
reported to have reliability and efficiency with interrater reliability
scores ranging from moderate to perfect agreement.7 The MMAT
utilizes a set of five categories, each with five associated specific cri-
teria, including a qualitative set, a randomized set, a non-random-
ized set, an observational descriptive set, and a mixed method set.
The MMAT version 2018 does not recommend scoring against
the category criteria, rather a description of what was met or not
met.7 The included studies were appraised independently by the
second and last authors based on theMMAT version 2018 criteria,
with two studies excluded based on the quality assessment. Results
of the critical appraisal of the papers using the MMAT version
2018 ranged from papers meeting between three and five (out of
five) of the criteria.
Results
Forty articles met the inclusion criteria for the final review, four
(n= 4; 10.0%) qualitative and 36 (n= 36; 90.0%) quantitative
studies, 24 (n = 24; 60.0%) reported on infectious disease out-
breaks, eight (n= 8; 20.0%) reported bioterrorist incidents, and
eight (n = 8; 20.0%) reported on both in the same study. All articles
were published from 2003 through 2020, with 30 (n= 30; 75.0%)
from 2003 through 2010, demonstrating an increase in literature
on WTR post-SARS-outbreak of 2002-2003 and the H1N1
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outbreak of 2009. A large majority of studies were from the United
States (n= 30; 75.0%), with other studies included from
Singapore, Australia, Taiwan, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and an international nongovernment organization
(NGO). The majority of the included papers focused on acute hos-
pital HCWs (n= 17; 42.5%), with the remainder primarily focused
on public health staff (n= 7; 17.5%), Emergency Medical Service
(EMS)/paramedics (n= 6; 15.0%), primary health staff (n= 5;
12.5%), health students (n= 3; 7.5%), and dentists and
international NGO HCWs (n= 1; 2.5% each).
Trends in Willingness
Rates ofHCWWTR to infectious disease outbreaks ranged widely
among the 40 studies located, from 27.9% (n= 31/111) of school
nurses asked to respond to a smallpox event when unvaccinated8 to
86.0% (n = 2,736/3,181) of medical reserve corps for an inhala-
tional anthrax event.9 For natural infectious disease events, willing-
ness varied from 8.3% (n= 5/60) to 100.0% (n= 60/60) among
general practitioners asked to provide care for their own patients
during an influenza pandemic without and with assurances of
adequate personal protective equipment (PPE), respectively10
(Table 1). Fourteen articles reported scenarios where willingness
levels were less than 60.0%.2,4,8,10-20 Willingness to respond varied
by occupation, pathogen, disease source, level of perceived risk,
degree of familiarity with patient population, and required
job tasks.
In general, HCWs appeared to be most willing to respond to
infectious disease outbreaks when: (1) the pathogenwas non-trans-
missible; (2) they were provided adequate PPE; or (3) an effective
prophylaxis, vaccine, or treatment was provided to both workers
and their families (Table 1). The primary factors affecting WTR
to naturally occurring outbreaks were individual-level characteris-
tics, such as clinical or non-clinical work, occupation, and prior
commitment to provide emergency care. Factors affecting WTR
to bioterrorist incidents were typically structural or organizational
in nature, such as availability of vaccine or PPE, safety of family
members, and provision of information on the pathogen involved.
Barriers to Willingness
Of the 40 studies identified, 33 (n= 33; 82.5%) identified specific
barriers to willingness (Table 2).2,4,8-11,13-18,20-38 The barriers to
willingness could be categorized into the following four groups:
concern and perceived risk, interpersonal factors, job-level factors,
and outbreak characteristics.
Concern and Perceived Risk—Concern for personal safety or the
safety of family members was identified as a barrier to willingness
in 12 (n = 12; 30.0%) studies with fear of being infected by a
patient and/or fear of transmitting infection to their families pri-
mary concerns for HCWs.3,4,8,16,17,26,37,38 Three studies (n= 3;
7.5%), all conducted in Singapore, found that HCWs were con-
cerned that either they or their family members would be ostracized
or face stigma from community members who might perceive the
workers or their families as disease carriers.26,37,38 In addition, lack
of PPE was cited as a specific barrier in two studies (n= 2;
5.0%).10,34 In two other studies (n= 2; 5.0%), the required perfor-
mance of perceived high-risk tasks, such as patient resuscitation,
was an important barrier.13,25
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Interpersonal Factors—Interpersonal factors were common bar-
riers toWTR amongHCWs. Personal responsibilities, such as car-
ing for family members who may fall ill, coupled with a lack of
available resources to support these responsibilities, such as child
care, elder care, and pet care services, were listed as barriers in seven
studies (n= 7; 17.5%).4,14,16,17 Another two studies (n= 2; 5.0%)
found that staffing shortages were a potential barrier, primarily due
to a perception that shortages would lead to conflict among
coworkers or being overworked.10,26 Similarly, concern about
potential conflicts arising from working with untrained volunteers
was a significant barrier to willingness among some HCWs.14 In
addition, HCWs whose spouse or partner also worked in health
care, or whose spouse was also an emergency responder, reported
different levels of willingness from other HCWs, although the evi-
dence was conflicting: one study found workers were less willing to
respond if their spouse was also aHCW,3 while a second found that
having a spouse who was a first responder increased willingness.4
Job-Level Factors—Requirements to work longer hours during an
outbreak and part-time status among a general group of HCWs
were associated with lower WTR, as was volunteer status among
emergency medical technicians (EMTs).2,3,14 A lack of inclusion
of training and education in health curriculum for disaster medicine
and public health preparedness was found to also be a barrier for
students entering the workforce.18,20,33 Health care workers were
typically more willing to respond to an outbreak if they were likely
to provide care to their own patients rather than to unfamiliar
patients.10,28
Outbreak Characteristics—Although concern, perceived risk, and
level of knowledge regarding the pathogen involved in the outbreak
were clear barriers to willingness, only limited information was
available on other outbreak characteristics. One study found that
WTR may decrease as an outbreak continues due to a reduction
in perceived duty to treat.11 This may suggest that WTR will vary
over the duration of outbreaks of long duration, with HCWs
becoming less willing to respond as the outbreak progresses. In
addition, outbreak location may be important: HCWs in one study
were less willing to respond to outbreak situations outside their
home town or state.28Willingness was also influenced by the avail-
ability of a vaccine34 or the unknown nature of the pathogen,36 cre-
ating a barrier to responding in some reported studies.
Facilitators of Willingness
Only four of the 40 (n= 4; 10.0%) studies did not identify at least
one facilitator of willingness among HCWs (Table 2).25,26,37,38
The facilitators of willingness could be categorized into the follow-
ing five groups: availability of PPE and/or vaccine, level of training,
professional ethics, family and personal health and safety, and
worker support systems.
Availability of PPE and/or Vaccine—Overall, nine (n= 9; 22.5%)
studies mentioned infection control, vaccination, or PPE as an
important facilitator of HCW WTR.4,14-16,19,28,30,39 Lack of
adequate provisions to prevent infection amongHCWs significantly
impacted WTR: the lowest level of WTR noted was the 8.3%
(n= 5/60) of general practitioners in Tasmania, Australia willing
to provide care to patients during an influenza pandemic if they were
not provided with PPE; however, when assured that they would be
provided with appropriate PPE, 100.0% (n= 60/60) were willing to
provide care to their own patients.10 Comparisons between studies
further support the importance of providing adequate PPE and vac-
cination, as HCWs were generally willing to respond to smallpox
outbreaks with vaccine (65.0% [535/823] of EMTs3 and 61.1% [n
= 3,447/5,645] of clinical and non-clinical HCWs4); however, only
approximately thirty percent of both physicians (n= 174/526;
33.1%) and school nurses (n= 31/111; 27.9%) were willing to
respond to a smallpox outbreak when informed that they would
not have access to vaccine (Table 1).8,11
Level of Training—Nine of the 40 (n= 9; 22.5%) studies included
in this review specifically identified the amount of training received
as a facilitator of willingness.3,4,8,11,14,16,17,28,30 Health care workers
who felt adequately prepared to respond in an infectious disease
emergency were also willing to respond.11 Training on bioterror-
ism, weapons of mass destruction, or other terrorism scenarios,3
especially following the events of 9/11, were particularly important
for increasing WTR.8,11 In addition, the HCWs’ existing level of
knowledge about emergency response for infectious diseases,
coupled with a belief in the importance of bioterrorism or prepar-
edness training, were associated with WTR.28 Finally, confidence
in one’s ability to diagnose and treat bioterrorism-related diseases
was also important;40 and training opportunities in preparedness,
response, and use of PPE were identified in several studies as a fac-
tor that could improve willingness.30,41,42
Professional Ethics—Eleven (n = 11; 27.5%) studies identified
HCWs’ feelings of moral or ethical responsibility to provide care
during an infectious disease outbreak as an important factor in will-
ingness.3,8,10,11,15,17 Health care workers who believed they had a
duty to treat patients with serious communicable diseases, such
as HIV/AIDS, or a duty to treat patients during an epidemic were
more willing to respond during infectious disease emergencies than
HCWs who did not perceive these duties.11 Overall, a sense of
duty,3,17 a perceived moral obligation10 to treat patients regardless
of personal risk,8 a belief that coworkers would respond3 and need
help,10 or that their patients really needed help15 were all important
facilitators. A perception of one’s importance to the organization
further facilitated willingness.12
Family and Personal Health and Safety—Four (n = 4; 10.0%)
studies identified availability of vaccines and prophylaxis for
HCWs’ families as a critical facilitator of willingness.4,14,15,19 In
addition, having a personal preparedness plan4 or an institutional
preparedness plan4,14 which included provisions for child care,
elder care, and pet care were identified as important facilitators.2,14
Worker Support Systems—Six (n= 6; 15.0%) studies identified
worker support systems to help facilitate willingness.2,14,16,28,35,39
Valued supports included telephone and email access,2 transporta-
tion support,2,14,39 provision of food2 and accommodation,2,14 and
guaranteed financial supports, such as life and/or disability insur-
ance or hazard pay.14,39 A study of WTR among nursing students
further supported the value of providing food, opportunities for rest
and personal hygiene (eg, showers), and organizational programs to
support mental and spiritual health, such as available chaplains.20
Another aspect that facilitated WTR was having clear roles within
the response and/or their respective organizations and associated
expectations of input towards control of the infectious disease
emergency.11,12,21-23
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Beyond Acute HCW
Although available evidence suggested many HCWs may not be
willing to respond during an infectious disease emergency, there
was some indication that staffing shortfalls or surge capacity could
be provided for using workers or volunteers from other occupa-
tional groups. Identification of surge capacity workforces was
not a focus of the current review; nevertheless, the search strategy
returned a number of papers on WTR among non-hospital
HCWs, which appeared valuable.
Groups which may be highly willing to respond to infectious
disease emergencies included veterinarians, pharmacists, health
department employees, and medical or health science students
or faculty. For example, 90.1% (n= 471/523) of US medical stu-
dents in one study reported WTR to pandemic influenza,33 and
79.0% (n = 384/486) of pharmacists in Florida (USA) reported
WTR to a bioterrorist incident.28 In another study of medical stu-
dents in theNetherlands, only 65.9% (n= 659/999) were willing to
respond to a bioterrorist event and 43.0% (n= 430/999) to an
Ebola type outbreak.18 However, the ability for planners to rely
on students as surge capacity may be highly dependent on outbreak
characteristics and perceived risk, and students’ concerns appeared
to be similar to those of HCWs. In one study for instance, only
56.9% (n= 128/225) of nursing students in Taiwan were willing
to respond to an avian influenza outbreak.20
Finally, seven (n= 7, 17.5%) studies suggested that health
department employees were willing to respond to biological emer-
gencies.12,13,22,24,35,36,43 A series of studies conducted by a research
group at Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, Maryland USA)
found that fifty-four percent to ninety-four percent of local health
department employees in the US were willing to respond to pan-
demic influenza.12,22,24 A study of county health department
employees in Florida found that 92.3% (n= 2,228/2,414) were
willing to respond to pandemic influenza, although when asked
about performing high-risk tasks, willingness dropped to 56.2%
(n = 1,357/2,414).13
It should be noted that the prospect of working with untrained
volunteers had been demonstrated to reduce WTR among
HCWs.14 Therefore, care should be taken to ensure that adequate
training is provided to all volunteers and surge capacity workers.
Methodological Limitations
Although there is a growing body of literature on HCW WTR
during infectious disease emergencies, few of the located studies
presented participants with a range of outbreak scenarios, limiting
the comparability of willingness levels between outbreak types,
locations, or scenarios. In addition, few studies asked participants
to provide feedback on the relative importance of specific barriers or
facilitators of willingness in determining their decisions to report to
work. Finally, no studies compared WTR with data on actual
response levels during previous disease outbreaks.
Discussion
Low levels of WTR to infectious disease emergencies among
HCWs may have catastrophic implications during large-scale
bioterrorist events, outbreaks, or pandemics. However, HCW non-
illness-related absenteeism is often overlooked. This review identi-
fied only 40 studies published over 20 years. Many of these studies
focused primarily on ability to respond during outbreaks rather than
willingness. However, these studies suggest that HCW WTR to
large-scale biological incidents may be less than fifty percent and
is unlikely to be higher than eighty percent, highlighting the
importance of considering willingness of HCW to respond in
preparing for biological emergencies. Preparedness planners who
exclusively focus on factors affecting ability to respond, such
illness-related absenteeism, may significantly over-estimate the
availability of HCWs during an infectious disease outbreak.
However, planners have the opportunity to enhance willingness sig-
nificantly by including provisions that ensure the risk to HCWs and
their families isminimized44 and that help ease the child, elder, or pet
care responsibilities that HCW face.
Vaccination
The importance of vaccination availability during an outbreak is
evident from the literature. In particular, a lack of available small-
pox vaccine greatly reduced HCW WTR to a hypothetical out-
break of smallpox, from around sixty percent to seventy percent
down to only thirty percent ofHCWs.3,4,8,11 Although it is unlikely
that HCWs would be denied vaccine during a smallpox outbreak,
or during any outbreak for which a vaccine was available, it is
unclear how apprehension and lack of acceptance of a vaccine
might affect HCW WTR. In the case of smallpox, refusal to be
vaccinated may be high. A study of private physicians found that
only twenty-two percent of physicians surveyed were willing to
be vaccinated in advance of a smallpox outbreak.45
Vaccine availability and attitudes towards vaccinations became
highly controversial issues during the H1N1 pandemic.
Importantly, a study conducted from June through September of
2009 inMexico found that HCWswere generally willing to receive
the H1N1 vaccine and to recommend the vaccine to their
patients.46 However, nineteen percent of HCWs answered that
they would refuse the vaccine and twenty-two percent would not
recommend the vaccine to their patients, largely due to a belief that
the vaccine would not work, that it would be harmful, or that it
would weaken the recipient’s immune system.46 Unfortunately, this
study was conducted before a vaccine against H1N1 influenza
became available, so no comparison of perceived acceptance and
actual uptake was available.
Whether refusal to accept vaccine would influence the decision
ofHCWs to respond to an influenza pandemic, smallpox outbreak,
or other type of biological emergency is at present unknown and
should be explored.
Ethical Concerns
Several studies highlighted the importance of codes of ethics in
determining whether HCWs respond during infectious disease
emergencies and noted the current lack of universal ethical guid-
ance. Such guidelines may help workers balance responsibilities
to patients and their own family members, and the development
of such guidelines should be considered.
Recommendations
Professional ethical guidelines that address personal risks and con-
cerns are needed to guide HCWs during an infectious disease out-
break. The findings of this review may help to inform these
guidelines. In addition, employers should work with HCWs to
ensure that they are familiar with their organization’s preparedness
plans, including what is expected of workers, what services (such as
child care, pet care, overtime pay, sick leave, and transportation aid)
the employer will provide, and what provisions exist for providing
prophylaxis or medical care to family members of HCWs.
Employers should also work with employees to ensure that every
HCW has a personal preparedness plan.
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Preparedness planners should consider reaching out to groups
such as veterinarians; nursing, medical, veterinary, or public health
students and faculty; and health department employees when devel-
oping surge capacity strategies. However, planners should remember
that students may not be willing to respond during more severe
emergencies, such as avian influenza or bioterrorism events.18,20,33
Finally, training programs should be developed to provide guid-
ance to HCWs on managing patient load during outbreaks and on
the delivery of patient care, including altered standards of care, dur-
ing outbreaks. Training programs should also ensure that HCWs
have a good understanding of the use of PPE and of vaccines, and
other prophylaxis measures that may be used during a biological
disaster, to ensure maximum uptake of these measures during an
outbreak. In addition, training programs for volunteers are crucial
to ensuring safety of volunteers, HCWs, and patients, as well as
supporting WTR among HCWs.
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Qureshi et al, 20054
(United States)/Criteria 4.4 for
quantitative descriptive studies
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Cross-sectional survey of HCWs from
each of 47 health care facilities in
New York City and the surrounding
metropolitan area: convenience
sampling
Clinical and non-clinical HCWs
Total N= 6,428
Response rate = n/a
Smallpox N= 5,645
Response rate = n/a
SARS N= 4,017
Response rate = n/a
Smallpox
SARS
1,946 (48) 3,447 (61)
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Shabanowitz & Reardon, 200939
(United States)/Criteria 4.2 and 4.4
for quantitative descriptive studies
not met
Cross-sectional survey of HCWs at a
rural tertiary/quaternary health
system – purposive sampling
All health system employees
N= 908
Response rate= 9%
Avian influenza pandemic 554 (61)d
Shaw et al, 200610
(Australia)/All criteria for qualitative
studies met
Semi-structured interviews with gen-
eral practitioners purposively chosen
to diversify the sample
General Practitioners
N= 60
Response rate = n/a
Pandemic influenza




Syrett et al, 200719
(United States)/Criteria 4.2 for
quantitative descriptive studies
not met
Cross-sectional survey of emergency
personnel: convenience sample
ED health care personnel, EMS
providers, and ancillary staff
N= 186
Response rate= 100%
Unexplained increase in patient
numbers









Taylor et al, 201836 (United States)/
All criteria for qualitative studies met
Focus group – purposive sampling Local health department staff




Tzeng & Yin, 200620 (Taiwan)/
Criteria 4.2 for quantitative descrip-
tive studies not met





Avian influenza 128 (57)
Wong et al, 2008a37
(Singapore)/Criteria 4.2 and 4.4 for
quantitative descriptive studies
not met
Cross sectional survey of primary




Response rate = n/a
Public primary care physicians
N= 149
Response rate= 73%
Private primary care physicians
N= 136
Response rate= 67%
Avian Influenza 120 (80)e
89 (64)e
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Wong et al, 2008b38
(Singapore)/Criteria 4.2 and 4.4 for
quantitative descriptive studies
not met
Survey of HCWs at 18 public clinics
and one tertiary hospital – purposive
sampling
HCWs Total N= 1,859






Avian Influenza 769 (76)e
651 (73)e
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Table 1. Willingness to Respond during Infectious Disease Emergencies
Abbreviations: MMAT, Mixed Methods Assessment Tool; EPPM, Extended Parallel Process Model; EMS, Emergency Medical Services; HCW, health care worker; EMT, emergency
medical technician; NGO, nongovernmental organization; SARS, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome; ED, emergency department; PPE, personal protective equipment.
a Rounded to nearest percentage.
bN/a: data not available.
cWillingness calculated as % reporting willingness level as: extremely, quite a bit, or moderate amount.
dWillingness measures % disagreement with the statement “It would be ethical for health care personnel to abandon their workplace during a pandemic to protect themselves and their families.”
eWillingness was calculated from % agreement with statement “I should not be looking after bird flu patients.”
fWillingness was measured using the question “Would you remain on duty to treat/care for patients with smallpox if : : : ” followed by a series of scenarios for personal protection. % willingness
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(ordered in strength of association, where applicable)
Identified Barriersa




B • Feeling personally prepared to aid in a bioterrorism incident
• Belief in professional duty to treat patient in epidemics or with HIV
• Having “learned a lot about physician’s roles in responding
to bioterrorism since 9/11”
• Perceived duty to treat may diminish over the course of an epidemic
Ballicer et al 200612
(United States)
N • Perception of capacity to communicate effectively
• Perception of role in agency
• Perception of familiarity with role-specific response requirements
• Lack of training
• Concern for family
Balicer et al, 201021
(United States)
N • Perception of role in agency
• Treatment/vaccine availability
• Availability of PPE
• Lack of training
• Concern for family
Barnett et al, 200922
(United States)
N • Perception of capacity to communicate effectively
• Perception of role in agency
• Perception of familiarity with role-specific response requirements
• Lack of training
• Concern for family
Barnett et al, 201023
(United States)
N • Understanding of role within a pandemic
• Understanding importance of role in a pandemic
• Confidence about safety at work
• Risk to family
Barnett et al, 201024
(United States)
N & B • Being psychologically prepared
• Confidence in personal safety at work
• Perceived ability to perform duties
• Public health funding
• Poorly prepared by agency
Basta et al, 200913
(United States)
N • Read state/county pandemic preparedness plan
• Higher level qualifications
• Low-risk duties
• High-risk duties
• Concern for family safety




N • Required duties: HCWs responsible for patient resuscitation were less
willing to respond
Cheong et al, 200726
(Singapore)
N • Perceived risk of personal exposure/risk to family
• Concern about stigma towards HCWs
• Conflict between colleagues due to staffing shortages
Cone et al, 20062
(United States)
N & B • Support needs for self/family that would enable respondents to stay at
hospital for prolonged periods:
• Local phone service







• WTR assumed the following conditions:
• “Family’s basic safety, food, and shelter needs” met
• “Roads and conditions are safe and passable”
• Standard overtime rates apply
• “Adequate rest, food, showers, etc” between shifts
• Other emergency response obligations, including paid and volunteer
positions
Murray © 2021 Prehospital and Disaster Medicine
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Considine & Mitchell,
200927 (Australia)
N • Strong social supports
• Experience or training in handling chemical, biological, and
radiological incidents
• Child care responsibilities
Crane et al, 201028 B • Benefits available
• Previous training drills
• Seriousness of event
• Level of risk
• Proximity of event (less willing to respond to events further from home)
Damery et al, 200914
(United Kingdom)
N • Vaccine provided to HCW and family
• Available PPE
• Employer emergency plan shared w/employees
• Employers accepting liability for any mistakes
• Ability to work flexible hours
• “Top up salary” which reflects extra duties required
• Receiving life and/or disability insurance
• Child care services provided
• Transportation provided
• Accommodation provided
• Ability to work nearer home
• Responsibility to care for one’s own ill children, partner
• Being required to work more hours than normal
• Working with untrained volunteers
DiMaggio et al, 20053
(United States)
B • Hands-on bioterrorism, weapons of mass destruction, or other
terrorism training
• Sense of responsibility
• Ability to provide care
• Code of ethics
• Part of response team
• Belief that colleagues would respond
• Concern for family
• Concerned about disease
• Spouse or partner also required to respond to emergency
• Volunteer EMTs less willing to respond than paid EMTs
Errett et al, 20139
(United States)
N & B • Perceived ability to perform duties
• Improving confidence
• Awareness of positive impact of responding
• Concern for family
• Concern about becoming ill
Gee & Skovdal,
201729 (International)
N • Previous experience in dangerous situations
• Trust in organization
• Humanitarian ethos
• Duty of care
• Curiosity
• Family perception of risk to HCW
• Competing media messages
Gershon et al, 200930
(United States)
N • Targeted training
• Confidence in knowledge
• Training on use of respiratory PPE (N95 masks)
• Inadequate training on N95 mask use
Gershon, et al, 201015
(United States)
N • Being given a vaccine for protection
• Being confident that a respirator mask would protect them
• Being given a respirator mask
• Belief that HCWs’ patients really needed them
• Guarantees that the HCWs’ families would receive vaccine quickly
• Fear for family’s safety
• Fear for personal safety
Gullion, 20048
(United States)
N & B • Belief in obligation to care for a patient, even if doing somay put themat
risk
• Amount of education received on bioterrorism after 9/11
• Less willing to care for patients when there is personal risk
Murray © 2021 Prehospital and Disaster Medicine
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(ordered in strength of association, where applicable)
Identified Barriersa
(ordered in strength of association, where applicable)
Hayanga et al, 201731
(United States)
N • Education and training
• Clear role
• Psychological preparation
• Inadequate training and preparation
Hogg et al, 200632
(United States)
N • Building partnerships between primary care and public health • Lack of preparation of family practice office
Irvin et al, 200816
(United States)
N • Confidence that the hospital can protect them • Fear for personal safety
• Responsibility to care for ill family members
Kaiser et al, 200933
(United States)
N • Specific clinical roles • Inadequate training and education on health curriculum for disaster
medicine and public health preparedness
Katz et al, 2006a41
(United States)
B • Additional bioterrorism preparedness and response training
Katz et al, 2006b42
(United States)
B • Additional bioterrorism preparedness and response training
Mas et al, 200640
(United States)





B • Sense of duty to occupation • Concern for family health
• Concern for personal safety
• Concern for child care
Mortelmans et al,
201518 (Netherlands)
N & B • Development and implementation of training guidelines • Inadequate training and education in health curriculum
Qureshi et al, 20054
(United States)
N & B • Marriage to a first responder
• Occupation: physician or EMT
• Availability of PPE
• Family preparedness planning and personal preparedness discussions
with employer
• Fear and concern for family and self
• Personal health concerns
• Child care and elder care responsibilities




N • Feeling safe
• Pre-exposure prophylaxis
• Lack of PPE
• Poor influenza vaccination uptake
Rutkow et al, 201444
(United States)
N • Laws to respond not a significant facilitator
Rutkow et al, 201543
(United States)
N • Laws to respond not a significant facilitator
Rutkow et al, 201735
(United States)
N • Availability of vaccinations and PPE
• Flexible work schedules and child care arrangements
• Information sharing via local health department training
• Perception of commitment to job/community
• Exposure to self and family
• Care responsibilities of children, elderly, and pets
• Role perception
Murray © 2021 Prehospital and Disaster Medicine
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N • Available PPE and training, including vaccine
• Available infectious disease training
• Ability to volunteer to work, without risk of losing one’s job for
not volunteering
• Opportunities for personal or financial help
• Financial incentives for volunteering to work, including hazard pay and/
or supplemental life or disability insurance
Shaw et al, 200610
(Australia)
N • Moral imperative during pandemic: not providing care seen as an
abandonment of responsibilities to both patients and colleagues
• Workforce shortages
• Lack of personal protective equipment
Syrett et al, 200719
(United States)
B • Effective treatment and available offered on site to workers
• Treatment dissemination methods that include providers’ family
members
Taylor et al, 201836
(United States)
N • Response education and training
• Expectation to respond from leadership
• Personal commitment to public health
• Professional code of ethics
• Previous response experience
• Availability of PPE
• Clear and strong leadership
• Uncertainty about the pathogen (novel virus)
• Family responsibilities
Tzeng & Yin, 200620
(Taiwan)
N • Holistic health promotion for frontline HCWs
• Providing a safe environment
• Taiwan experience with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
Wong et al, 2008a37
(Singapore)
N • Fear of infection risk for self, family, and friends
• Fear of stigma and ostracism for self, family, and friends
Wong et al, 2008b38
(Singapore)
N • Fear of infection risk for self, family, and friends
• Fear of stigma and ostracism for self, family, and friends
Murray © 2021 Prehospital and Disaster Medicine
Table 2. Facilitators and Barriers to Willingness to Respond during Infectious Disease Emergencies
Abbreviations: PPE, personal protective equipment; HCW, health care worker; WTR, willingness to respond; EMT, emergency medical technician.
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